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OHIO’S LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH
MARITAL AGREEMENTS: WHY OHIO SHOULD
LIFT ITS PROHIBITION ON POSTNUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS
NATASHA WASIL*
ABSTRACT
Ohio has been accepting of prenuptial agreements since its landmark decision in
Gross v. Gross in 1984, declaring them to be not void per se as being against public
policy. Unfortunately, Ohio’s evolution of the law regarding marital agreements has
remained at a stand-still since Gross. Through the twenty-first century, a majority of
states have responded to the evolution of marriage by enacting legislation, or judicially
by court order, to allow spouses to enter into contracts after marriage to allocate the
division of property and legal obligations of the couple in the event of divorce,
commonly known as “postnuptial agreements.” Ohio remains in the minority of
jurisdictions that strictly prohibit spouses from entering into postnuptial agreements.
Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06 forbids a husband and wife from altering their
legal relations after marriage; thus rendering postnuptial agreements void and
unenforceable in Ohio. The antiquated language and patriarchal principles of Ohio’s
current statute should be revised to modernize Ohio’s law in conformity with other
states. Further, Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06 violates a party’s freedom to
contract, and should be amended to allow spouses to alter their legal relations with the
enactment of certain conditions to protect the fiduciary relationship from fraud, duress,
undue influence, and unconscionability.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Ask anyone about the likelihood of a successful marriage in the United States, and
they will tell you the old adage that “fifty percent of marriages end in divorce.” While
this may have been true at one time, that is simply no longer the case1 – much to the
credit of various marital agreements available to couples that take the uncertainty out
of marriage.2
Marriage and divorce rates in the United States have both decreased in the last ten
years.3 The decrease in divorce rates has been linked to an increase in the duration of
recent marriages.4 On average, Americans are waiting until they are older to get

1 Renée Peltz Dennison, Do Half of All Marriages Really End in Divorce?, PSYCH. TODAY
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/heart-the-matter/201704/do-halfall-marriages-really-end-in-divorce [https://perma.cc/BMJ9-5DZS].
2 Heather L. Locus, Why Prenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements Lead to Stronger Marriages
and Prevent Disastrous Divorces, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/heatherlocus/2018/09/23/why-prenuptial-and-postnuptialagreements-lead-to-stronger-marriages-and-prevent-disastrous-divorces/#7af92f1164880
[https://perma.cc/2LTL-HZHG].
3 U.S. Marriage and Divorce Rates by State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/marriage-divorce-rates-by-state.html
[https://perma.cc/NR8J-YDEL].
4 “[A]s the divorce rate is calculated as a percentage of marriages, the 18% fall in divorces
between 2008 . . . and 2016 isn’t merely a consequence of fewer marriages. The implication is
that contemporary unions are lasting longer than those of 10 years ago.” Johnny Wood, The
United States Divorce Rate Is Dropping, Thanks to Millennials, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 5, 2018),
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married, contributing to low marriage rates.5 Prospective spouses are increasingly
prioritizing their careers and financial stability before entering into marriage.6 As older
and more sophisticated marriage partners, these couples are more likely to want to
prearrange their legal obligations in case of separation or divorce.7
Prenuptial, postnuptial, and separation agreements each seek to determine a
couple’s rights and obligations upon divorce.8 The distinguishing factor between such
agreements is timing. Prenuptial agreements prospectively address the separation and
division of property in contemplation of future marriage;9 whereas postnuptial
agreements retrospectively provide for the division of property after marriage.
Postnuptial agreements are entered into, and only become effective, after marriage.
Separation agreements are similarly entered into after marriage, but with an important
distinction from postnuptial agreements. Separation agreements are entered into with
the intent to end the marriage.10 By contrast, spouses entering into prenuptial
agreements and postnuptial agreements share a common goal to preserve the
marriage.11

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/10/divorce-united-states-dropping-becausemillennials/ [https://perma.cc/5VPJ-QQL5].
5 Marital ages have steadily increased in the United States over the past century. In 2019, the
median age at first marriage for men and women was 29.8 years and 28.0 years, respectively.
In 1990, the median age at first marriage for men and women was 26.1 and 23.9 years,
respectively. By 1970, the median marital age was significantly lower, at 23.2 and 20.8 years,
respectively. See Historical Marital Status Tables: Table MS-2. Estimated Median Age at First
CENSUS
BUREAU,
Marriage,
by
Sex:
1890
to
the
Present,
U.S.
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/families/marital.html (last revised Nov.
23, 2020) (click on “Table MS-2” under the list of tables to access this Excel datasheet).
6 See Hillary Hoffower, 7 Ways Millennials are Changing Marriage, From Signing Prenups
to Staying Together Longer Than Past Generations, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2020, 9:43 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-millennials-are-changing-marriage-divorce-weddingsprenups-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/7ZQG-CNJ5] (“[Millennials] are predisposed to protect their
interests, especially when it comes to the assets and debt they’ve had more time to accumulate
before marrying.”); see also Sandra Alcaide & Lynne Marie Kohm, Obergefell: A GameChanger for Women, 14 AVE MARIA L. REV. 99, 103 (2016) (“[T]he marriage decline has been
particularly pronounced among millennials, where the marriage rate dropped from sixty-eight
percent to twenty-six percent between 1960 and 2008.”).
7 See generally Jessica Dickler, Before Saying ‘I Do,’ More Millennials Say ‘Prenup,’ CNBC
(Nov. 25, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/25/before-saying-i-do-moremillennials-say-prenup.html [https://perma.cc/UXT3-82MK]; Susan Shain, The Rise of the
Millennial Prenup, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/smarterliving/millennial-prenup-weddings-money.html [https://perma.cc/3U79-RVKR].
8 Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 828 (2007).
9 Id.
10 PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAM. DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
7.01(1)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2002).

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS §

11 Id. § 7.01(1)(b).
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Prenuptial agreements have been commonly used for decades as safeguards for
men and women who are cautious about entering into marriage, and remain a steady
trend in marital law.12 Postnuptial agreements, though not as common as prenuptial
agreements, are an increasingly common tool for the protection of separate property.
While the validity of prenuptial agreements is uniformly recognized across the United
States,13 current law involving postnuptial agreements is sporadic, and lacks such
uniformity.14 Nevertheless, the majority of jurisdictions treat postnuptial agreements
as valid and enforceable contracts.15 State law varies considerably on the issue, with
some states addressing the validity of postnuptial agreements by statute, and others by
12 According to a 2016 survey of family lawyers, 51% of those surveyed saw an increase in
prenuptial agreements requests by millennials. Approximately 62% of the respondents noticed
an overall increase in the number of clients seeking prenuptial agreements during the past three
years. Prenuptial Agreements on the Rise Finds Survey, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/prenuptial-agreements-on-the-rise-finds-survey300353444.html [https://perma.cc/P97U-VARP].
13 Stephen T. Gary, To Agree or Not to Agree: Treatment of Post-Nuptial Agreements Under
Oklahoma Law, 63 OKLA L. REV. 779, 780 (2017); see also Brewsaugh v. Brewsaugh, 491
N.E.2d 748, 750 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1985) (noting that prenuptial agreements are recognized in
every common-law jurisdiction).
14 Id.
15 Postnuptial agreements are valid in: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE
§ 30-4-9 (2020); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.213 (2020); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1500 (West 2015);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-307 (2014); 14-2-309; FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (2020); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/502 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.180(1) (LexisNexis 1972); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2329 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 2 (1963); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 557.23 (1982);
MINN. STAT. § 519.11(2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.070
(2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-2 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. 52-10 (2013); Tibbs v. Anderson,
580 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Ala. 1991); In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 16 (Ariz. 1969); Stewart
v. Combs, 243 S.W.3d 294, 299–300 (Ark. 2006); Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 103 P.
190, 193–94 (Cal. 1909); In re Estate of Lewin, 595 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. App. 1979); Bedrick
v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 21 (Conn. 2011); Conigliaro v. Conigliaro, No. CN92-6566, 1992 WL
435703, at *7 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 30, 1992); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (Ga.
1982); Balogh v. Balogh, 332 P.3d 631, 642 (Haw. 2014); Sword v. Sweet, 92 P.3d 492, 497
(Idaho 2004); Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage
of Traster, 291 P.3d 494, 501 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); Campbell v. Campbell, 377 S.W.2d 93, 94
(Ky. Ct. App. 1964); McGeehan v. McGeehan, 167 A.3d 579, 597, 599 (Md. 2017); Ansin v.
Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Mass. 2010); Lipic v. Lipic, 103 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2003); Bronfman v. Bronfman, 645 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (App. Div. 1996); Stoner v.
Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 2003); Keith v. Keith, 156 N.W. 910, 911 (S.D. 1916); Bratton
v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004); Nesmith v. Burger, 64 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2001); Pierce v. Pierce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000); Allen v. Allen, 789 S.E.2d
787, 791 (Va. Ct. App. 2016); In re Parentage of G.W.-F., 285 P.3d 208, 215 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012); Amber J. v. Shannon J., No. 16-0289, 2017 WL 2229978, at *3 (W. Va. May 22, 2017);
Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Wis. 1986); Long v. Long, 413 P.3d 117, 122–23
(Wyo. 2018).
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common-law. For example, Illinois, Minnesota, and California each have taken a
legislative approach to addressing this issue.16 Connecticut and Massachusetts,
discussed in further detail in Part VI, have addressed the issue judicially.17
Of the states that have addressed the issue, Ohio remains in the minority of
jurisdictions that do not enforce postnuptial agreements as valid contracts.18 Currently,
only four other states – Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and New Jersey also disfavor
postnuptial agreements.19 Ohio takes a strict approach to the validity of postnuptial
agreements, expressly prohibiting them by statute.20 Ohio statutorily allows a husband
and wife to enter into a contract with one another,21 so long as it does not alter their
legal relations.22 A contract between spouses altering their legal relations is only valid
in Ohio if it is a separation agreement that contemplates spousal or child support.23
In 2016, Ohio’s divorce rate was nearly double the national average.24 There were
a total of 69,177 marriages across Ohio, of which approximately 67% were first

16 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(b) (2018) (encouraging the use of postnuptial agreements
to “promote amicable settlement of disputes”); MINN. STAT. § 519.11(1) (2005) (conditioning
postnuptial agreements on full and fair disclosure of earnings and property and opportunity to
consult with independent legal counsel); CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West 2020) (imposing
rebuttable presumption of undue influence).
17 See generally Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 21; Ansin, 929 N.E.2d at 961.
18 Approximately 37 states have addressed, whether legislatively or judicially, the validity of
postnuptial agreements. See statutes and cases cited supra note 15.
19 See, e.g., Hussemann ex rel. Ritter v. Hussemann, 847 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Iowa 2014)
(“Although [the Iowa] legislature authorizes antenuptial agreements, it makes no such
allowance for postnuptial agreements.”); Devney v. Devney, 886 N.W.2d 61, 68 (Neb. 2016)
(holding postnuptial agreements are void at common law and noting Nebraska statutes do not
authorize postnuptial agreements unless entered into for purposes of separation); Pacelli v.
Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (holding postnuptial agreements are
inherently coercive and must be closely scrutinized, but declining to regard postnuptial
agreements as unenforceable in general); see also Susan L. Racey & Joseph M. Ferraro, The
Postnuptial Agreement Renaissance: Can Ohio Emerge From the Dark Ages?, 29 PROB. L.J.
OHIO 195, 195 (2019).
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.06 (LexisNexis 1953) (“A husband and wife cannot, by any
contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except that they may agree to an immediate
separation and make provisions for the support of either of them and their children during the
separation.”).
21 Id. § 3103.05.
22 Id. § 3103.06.
23 Id. But cf. In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 16 (Ariz. 1969) (permitting spouses to enter
into postnuptial agreements without being incident to a contemplated separation or divorce).
24 In 2018, Ohio’s divorce rate was 2.9 divorces per 1,000 marriages. The same year, the
national divorce rate was 7.7 divorces per 1,000 marriages. Compare Marriage and Divorce
Reports: Vital Statistics (2018), OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH (June 9, 2020),
https://odh.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/odh/know-our-programs/vital-statistics/resources/vs-
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marriages.25 In the same year, Ohio issued a total of 35,190 divorces.26 Limiting
spouses in Ohio to only prenuptial agreements has not furthered the state’s public
policy goal of discouraging divorce.27 Postnuptial agreements are a valuable tool that
Ohio should adopt in an effort to address the increasing divorce rate throughout the
state. Overall, states that have recognized the validity of postnuptial agreements have
either lower divorce rates than the national average, or divorce rates that do not differ
significantly from the national average.28
This Note criticizes Ohio’s refusal to recognize the validity of postnuptial
agreements and argues that Ohio should join the majority of jurisdictions that regard
postnuptial agreements as valid and enforceable contracts. By remaining in the
minority, Ohio denies its citizens the right to a valuable tool in family law that may
provide an opportunity to lower the state’s increasing divorce rate.
Part II reviews the history of prenuptial agreements in Ohio, the standards under
which prenuptial agreements are held to be enforceable contracts, and Ohio’s refusal
to enforce postnuptial agreements. Part III argues that Ohio’s statutory prohibition on
postnuptial agreements violates basic principles of contract law, and in particular,
limits parties’ freedom to contract. A review of postnuptial agreement standards from
other jurisdictions provides insight for determining the standard Ohio should adopt in
enforcing postnuptial agreements. Part IV offers a standard best suited to protect the
fiduciary relationship of spouses in Ohio without sacrificing the freedom to contract.
Part V analyzes postnuptial agreements from a public policy standpoint and counters
Ohio’s primary rationale in prohibiting them – that postnuptial agreements violate
public policy by encouraging divorce. This Part further discusses the antiquated
language of Ohio’s statute prohibiting postnuptial agreements and the need for
revision due to gender equality and the legalization of same-sex marriage. This Note
concludes with Part VI, proposing draft legislation for Ohio to lift its prohibition on
postnuptial agreements, and instead adopt a standard for enforceability that comports
with Ohio’s public policy rationale. Part VII offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of Prenuptial Agreements in Ohio

In 1846, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that prenuptial agreements,
commonly referred to as antenuptial agreements, were “in favor of marriage and tend
to promote domestic happiness, by removing one of the frequent causes of family
disputes – contentions about property, and especially allowances to the wife.”29 Ohio
has long held that “prenuptial agreements controlling the distribution of assets upon
marriagedivorce2018 (click on “download” to access the data in Excel format), with U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 3.
25 Of the 65,660 marriages that occurred in Ohio in 2018, 46,266 were first marriages for the
bride, and 45,858 were first marriages for the groom. See OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 24.
26 Id.
27 Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984).
28 See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5.
29 Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610, 649 (1846).
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the death of a spouse may be enforceable.”30 In Juhasz v. Juhasz, the Supreme Court
of Ohio held that “a prenuptial contract would be enforced upon the death of a spouse
if it was voluntarily entered into and if the provision for the surviving spouse was fair
and reasonable under all the circumstances.”31 Even if a provision is wholly
disproportionate, the agreement may still be enforced if voluntarily entered into with
full disclosure or knowledge.32
The Supreme Court of Ohio later set forth certain conditions for the validity of
prenuptial agreements in Gross v. Gross, after determining that prenuptial agreements
were not void as being against public policy.33 Upon a review of several public policy
factors, the court concluded that the “modern trends of marriage and divorce across
the country dictate that reasonable laws must be forthcoming to accommodate these
changing social attitudes.”34 The court noted that these types of agreements may
reasonably “tend to promote or facilitate marriage, rather than encourage divorce.”35
Ohio law currently does not permit prenuptial agreements to be changed or revised
after marriage.36
B. Ohio’s Standard for Prenuptial Agreements: Gross v. Gross
In Gross v. Gross, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that prenuptial agreements are
“not void per se as being against public policy.”37 In reaching this conclusion, the
court was influenced by contemporary social changes, such as the greater frequency
of divorce, the decline in marriage rates, the adoption by a number of states of the
provisions of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, and most significantly, the
widespread adoption of “no fault” divorce laws.38 Gross set forth three conditions for
the validity and enforceability of prenuptial agreements in Ohio. Such agreements are
enforceable if: (1) “they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion

30 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343,1345 (Ohio 1994).
31 Id.
32 Juhasz v. Juhasz, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ohio 1938).
33 The Gross court stated:
We, therefore, join those other jurisdictions that have expressed the growing
trend of legal thought in this country that provisions contained within
antenuptial agreements providing for the disposition of property and
awarding sustenance alimony upon a subsequent divorce of the parties are
not void per se as being against public policy.
Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Hoffman v. Dobbins, No. 24633, 2009 WL 3119635, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30,
2009).
37 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
38 Id. at 505.
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or overreaching”; (2) “there was a full disclosure, or full knowledge, and
understanding, of the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse’s property”;
and (3) “the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.”39
Upon judicial review, prenuptial agreements must meet the general tests of fairness,
and must be construed in cognizance of the marital fiduciary relationship.40 Parties
must act in good faith, with a high degree of fairness and disclosure of all
circumstances which materially bear on the prenuptial agreement.41
Prenuptial agreements that are entered into as a result of fraud, duress, or coercion
are void and unenforceable. Agreements that are the product of overreaching, either
by a spouse’s artifice or cunning to outwit or cheat the other, or by significant disparity
in the understanding of the nature of the transaction, are similarly invalid.42 According
to Gross, the elements of the second condition may be satisfied either by an attachment
of a listing of the assets of each of the parties to the agreement, or alternatively,
evidence of full disclosure by other means.43 The aim of Gross’s third condition is to
encourage a fair and equitable distribution of property upon separation that does not
violate public policy.44 The third condition seeks to eliminate profiteering by divorce
by avoiding scenarios where parties enter into prenuptial agreements that provide a
significant windfall to the benefit of one spouse upon divorce, and within a short
period of time the benefitting party abandons the marriage.45
C. Ohio’s Treatment of Postnuptial Agreements
Ohio’s adoption of the three-part test in Gross was a product of the increasingly
adopted—and now universal—view that prenuptial agreements are not against public
policy. However, unlike the majority of jurisdictions across the United States, Ohio
arbitrarily continues to fail to recognize the validity of postnuptial agreements. Ohio
expressly prohibits postnuptial agreements and amendments to existing prenuptial
agreements by statute.46 Ohio courts have strictly applied Ohio Revised Code Section
3103.06 in holding that postnuptial agreements are void and unenforceable.
In Brewsaugh v. Brewsaugh, the Highland County Probate Court refused to
enforce a postnuptial agreement created by a husband and wife while living in New
Mexico.47 The husband was a long-time resident of Ohio, maintained an Ohio driver’s

39 Id. at 506.
40 Id. at 508.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 506.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.; see, e.g., In re Nagy, No. 07-99-0303-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3015, at *1–2 (Tex.
Ct. App. May 9, 2000) (filing for divorce within two months of signing postnuptial agreement).
46 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.06 (LexisNexis 1953).
47 Brewsaugh v. Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ohio 1985).
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license, and filed his income tax returns in Ohio.48 After marriage, the couple resided
in Ohio, but often spent winters in New Mexico.49 In light of the fact that both spouses
were domiciled in Ohio, the Court held that the postnuptial agreement created was
invalid and unenforceable under Section 3103.06.50 Similarly, the Ninth District Court
of Appeals held that an amendment to a prenuptial agreement that occurred after
marriage was void and unenforceable for altering the legal relations of a husband and
wife in violation of Section 3103.06.51
Ohio recognizes only two exceptions to Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06. First,
the statute permits spouses to alter their legal relations if entering into a separation
agreement.52 The separation agreement must expressly state that the parties are to
separate, or live separate and apart in the future, or it risks coming within the express
prohibition in Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06.53 The second exception is that an
oral prenuptial agreement that is memorialized in writing after the marriage will not
violate the statutory prohibition of Section 3103.06 if the oral agreement is referred to
in the written contract and the writing states that it is a memorandum of the oral
agreement.54 Reducing an oral contract made prior to marriage to writing satisfies the
statute of frauds, rendering the agreement compliant with Section 3103.06. Therefore,
it is simply a valid prenuptial contract which is reduced to writing after marriage.55
Ohio’s legislative history lacks an explanation for the prohibition of postnuptial
agreements.56 The rationale may be inferred from Ohio’s public policy concerns of
encouraging divorce, as stated in Gross.57 Others have assumed that the primary
reason is protection of the fiduciary relationship of spouses.58 More specifically, a
concern is that the interdependence implicit in a marital relationship may easily result

48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 751–52.
51 Hoffman v. Dobbins, No. 24633, 2009 WL 3119635, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2009).
52 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.06 (LexisNexis 1953).
53 Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d at 750; see also Smith v. Smith, 112 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 1953).
54 In re Estate of Weber, 167 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ohio 1960).
55 Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d at 750.
56 Ohio cases do not provide any reasoning or analysis as to the legislature’s intent in enacting
§ 3103.06. See, e.g., Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d at 750; see also Gary, supra note 13, at 795.
57 One element for the validity of prenuptial agreements in Ohio is that “the terms do not
promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.” Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506
(Ohio 1984).
58 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 8, at 843 (citing STANLEY MORGANSTERN & BEATRICE
SOWOLD, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 12:17 (2003 & Supp. 2007)
(“Married persons are embroiled in a highly delicate relationship of trust and interdependence.
. . . A contract entered during marriage is likely not to be entered at arms’ length’.”)).
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in one spouse taking advantage of the other or imposing a postnuptial agreement on
the other.59 By prohibiting postnuptial agreements, Ohio purports to limit the
potentiality for coercion or duress that may arise between spouses during
negotiation.60 However, other jurisdictions have upheld postnuptial agreements while
adequately protecting the fiduciary relationship. For example, California has adopted
a rebuttable presumption of duress based on similar concerns that must first be
overcome to enforce a postnuptial agreement.61 By being overly cautious, Ohio in turn
severely limits married parties’ ability to contract, which otherwise contravenes their
rights to freely contract were they not married.
III. OHIO’S PROHIBITION ON POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS VIOLATES BASIC
CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES
The validity of postnuptial agreements is consistent with the basic notion of
contract law that two consensual parties are free to contract with one another, absent
undue influence, fraud, mistake, or duress.62 Similar to prenuptial agreements,
postnuptial agreements are contracts that must be analyzed in accordance with the
well-settled principles of contract law. It is well-established that prenuptial agreements
are contracts, and, as such, should be evaluated under the same criteria applicable to
other types of contracts.63 “Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should
be bound by the terms of their agreements.”64
Ohio already uses a contractual approach in determining the validity of prenuptial
agreements.65 In addition to the requirements set forth in Gross v. Gross, Ohio
prenuptial agreements must include all the elements of a contract, including offer,
acceptance, consideration, manifestation of mutual assent, and contractual capacity.66
Prior to considering whether a “prenuptial agreement meets the Gross conditions, a
court must implicitly conclude that the prenuptial agreement contains all the elements
of an ordinary contract.”67 “If a prenuptial agreement is not, in fact, a valid contract,
the court need not address the Gross conditions.”68

59 Id.
60 Such forms of duress are “rarely discernible by a court and are most commonly not
witnessed by a disinterested third party.” Id.
61 Id. at 804; see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West 2020).
62 See generally Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994).
63 Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
64 Id.
65 Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP–925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10,
2008) (citing Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1346).
66 Id. (citing Kostelnik v. Helper, 770 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ohio 2002)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
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Ohio’s current statutory prohibition on postnuptial agreements violates the same
fundamental contractual principles Ohio has long recognized and adopted for
prenuptial agreements. If the requisite elements of offer, acceptance, and consideration
exist, together with the mutual assent of both parties, spouses should be free to enter
into a contract, even one that alters their legal relations.69 In lifting its ban on
postnuptial agreements, Ohio should adopt a preliminary contractual standard similar
to the existing standard for prenuptial agreements. Thus, postnuptial agreements
would be valid so long as they comport with general contractual principles, including
offer, acceptance, consideration, capacity, and most significantly, mutual assent.
After determining that the same preliminary contractual analysis should apply to
postnuptial agreements in Ohio, the more significant question is which conditions
Ohio should adopt in recognizing the validity of postnuptial agreements. Courts must
carefully scrutinize postnuptial agreements to determine whether they are inequitable
or unconscionable in light of the fiduciary nature of the marital relationship. In
determining the correct standard to apply, a review of current standards from various
jurisdictions is necessary.
While many states address the issue legislatively with varying approaches,70
Connecticut and Massachusetts are the most recent states to judicially address the
validity of postnuptial agreements, with similar, yet discernible standards.71
A. The Bedrick Standard
In 2011, Connecticut adopted a contractual approach to the validity and
enforcement of postnuptial agreements aimed at creating a stricter standard than
prenuptial agreements.72 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that postnuptial
agreements “are valid and enforceable and generally must comply with contract
principles.”73 The decision deviated from Connecticut’s existing standard for
prenuptial agreements by imposing additional restrictions for postnuptial agreements
that require a thorough examination of such agreements upon judicial review,
including that the terms be “both fair and equitable at the time of execution,” and “not
unconscionable at the time of dissolution.”74

69 Some courts are split as to whether consideration is a necessary element for the validity of
postnuptial agreements, and if so, what constitutes sufficient consideration. Compare Bratton
v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004) (holding that forbearance from impending
separation or divorce may be adequate consideration for a postnuptial agreement), with
Simmons v. Simmons, 249 S.W.3d 843, 845, 846–47 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (holding twentyfive year marriage was not valid consideration for a postnuptial agreement as past consideration
could not support a current promise).
70 See infra Part III(C).
71 See Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (Conn. 2011); Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955
(Mass. 2010).
72 Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 23.
73 Id. at 21.
74 Id.
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Connecticut’s standard for postnuptial agreements is subject to greater scrutiny
than Connecticut’s law governing prenuptial agreements.75 Postnuptial agreements
have a greater risk for coercion than prenuptial agreements due to the fiduciary
relationship between spouses.76 Connecticut recognized this risk in Bedrick v. Bedrick
by requiring parties to postnuptial agreements to contract under different conditions
from either prospective spouses or spouses who have intended to dissolve their
marriage.77 Consequently, Connecticut subjects postnuptial agreements to special
scrutiny to safeguard spouses from undue influence, duress, or coercion.78 Spouses
may be less cautious in contracting with one another than they would be with a thirdparty.79 “With lessened caution comes greater potential for one spouse to take
advantage of the other.”80 Spouses owe a fiduciary duty to each other during the
marriage. Connecticut’s standard reflects the fiduciary nature of the marital
relationship by refusing to treat postnuptial agreements as arm’s length transactions,81
but rather marital agreements subject to careful scrutiny.
1.

Fair and Equitable Terms

As a result of the unique nature of the marital relationship, Bedrick demands that
the terms of postnuptial agreements be fair and equitable at the time of execution.82
This condition requires that the agreement is made voluntarily, “without any undue
influence, fraud, coercion, duress, or similar defect.”83 The Supreme Court of
Connecticut adopted a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the terms
of a postnuptial agreement are fair and equitable at the time of execution.84 A court

75 Id. at 23.
76 “Prospective spouses share a ‘confidential relationship’; but spouses share the institution
of marriage, ‘one of the most fundamental of human relationships.’” Id. at 26 (first quoting
Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 549 (Conn. 2007); and then quoting Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574,
577 (Conn. 1934)).
77 Id. at 27.
78 “The circumstances surrounding [postnuptial] agreements in contract are pregnant with the
opportunity for one party to use the threat of dissolution to bargain themselves into positions of
advantage.” Id. at 26.
79 Id. at 27.
80 Id.
81 “[P]ostnuptial agreements ‘should not be treated as mere “business deals.”’ They recognize
that, just like prospective spouses, ‘parties to these agreements do not quite deal at arm’s length
but . . . stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust.’” Id. at 26 (quoting Stoner v. Stoner,
819 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 2003)).
82 Id. at 27; see also Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 601 (Tenn. 2004) (subjecting
postnuptial agreements to close scrutiny to ensure that they are fair and equitable due to the
confidential relationship between husband and wife).
83 Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 27.
84 Id. at 28.
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may consider the nature and complexity of the agreement’s terms;85 the extent and
disparity in marital assets; the parties’ respective age, sophistication, education,
employment, experience, prior marriage, or other traits potentially affecting the ability
to understand the agreement; the amount of time available to each spouse to reflect
upon the agreement; and each party’s access to independent counsel.86 Further
supporting the fiduciary relationship between spouses, “each spouse must be given
full, fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character, and value of property,
both jointly and separately held, and all of the financial obligations and income of the
other spouse.”87
2.

Unconscionability

Under the Bedrick standard, if a court finds that unfairness exists after the totality
of the circumstances analysis, it may still enforce a postnuptial agreement if the
spouses knowingly contracted for an unequal distribution of assets at the time of
dissolution.88 Bedrick reinforces the principle that two contracting parties are bound
by the terms of their agreement.89 Absent unforeseen circumstances that render the
agreement unconscionable at the time of enforcement, a postnuptial agreement will
not be unconscionable simply for a contractually bargained-for uneven distribution of
assets.90 Marriage is innately subject to unforeseeable circumstances,91 as parties are
“notoriously optimistic” about the likelihood of success of the marriage, and
“notoriously bad at foreseeing the potential disputes that will arise during the
marriage.”92 While it is generally not feasible for prospective spouses to contract for
all possible future events at the onset of the marriage, a postnuptial agreement will not
be found unconscionable without the existence of significantly changed or unforeseen

85 The Connecticut Supreme Court discussed the complexity factor in this way:
Although the length and complexity of a postnuptial agreement comprise
one of many factors courts may consider in evaluating the enforceability of
such an agreement, that factor is relevant only insofar as it bears on the
question of whether the parties understood the agreement’s terms at the time
of execution.
Yun Zhou v. Hao Zhang, 223 A.3d 775, 791 (Conn. 2020) (citation omitted).
86 Id. at 783.
87 Id.
88 “Unfairness or inequality alone does not render a postnuptial agreement unconscionable;
spouses may agree on an unequal distribution of assets at dissolution.” Id. at 792 (citing Bedrick,
17 A.3d at 23).
89 See also Lipic v. Lipic, 103 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he mere fact that
hindsight may indicate the provisions of the agreement were improvident does not render the
agreement unconscionable.”).
90 Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
91 Id.
92 Williams, supra note 8, at 828.
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circumstances from the time of execution of the agreement.93 If the requisite elements
of a contract are met, the court will refuse to inquire into the reasonableness of the
bargain absent such circumstances that render the agreement unconscionable.
The doctrine of unconscionability seeks to “prevent oppression and unfair
surprise.”94 Contracts are unconscionable when an absence of meaningful choice
exists on behalf of one party, coupled with contract terms that are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.95 Connecticut courts decide the question of
unconscionability as a matter of law based on the facts and circumstances of the case.96
In determining whether a postnuptial agreement is unconscionable at the time of
dissolution, courts consider a change in circumstances that significantly affect the
marital relationship, such as the birth of children, loss of employment, or relocation to
a different state.97
The postnuptial agreement at issue in Bedrick was held to be unconscionable. The
parties had amended their postnuptial agreement multiple times; the most recent
revision being approximately eighteen years before Mrs. Bedrick filed for divorce.98
The postnuptial agreement provided that a cash settlement of $75,000.00 was to be
paid in lieu of alimony in the event of divorce.99 At the time of dissolution, the marital
estate was valued at over $927,123.00.100 The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld
the trial court’s determination of unconscionability due to drastically changed
financial circumstances since the agreement was last modified in 1989.101 Since then,
Mr. and Mrs. Bedrick had a child together, and Mr. Bedrick’s car wash business,
which had initially prospered in the 1990s, had deteriorated financially by the
2000s.102
B. The Craven-Ansin Standard
In Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, Massachusetts adopted a postnuptial agreement standard
reminiscent of the Bedrick standard, with a few additional limitations. Craven-Ansin
adopted five conditions for the validity of postnuptial agreements, including whether:

93 Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
94 Cheshire Mortg. Serv. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1135 (Conn. 1992).
95 Bender v. Bender, 975 A.2d 636, 658 (Conn. 2009); see also Lipic v. Lipic, 103 S.W.3d
144, 149–50 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“[A] post-nuptial agreement is unconscionable when ‘the
inequality is so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be impossible to state it to one with
common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it.’”).
96 Bedrick, 17 A.3d at 28.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 21–22.
99 Id. at 22.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 29.
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(1) each party had access to separate legal counsel; (2) the agreement was
obtained by fraud or coercion; (3) full disclosure of assets existed prior to
execution of the agreement; (4) each spouse knowingly and explicitly agreed
in writing to waive the right to a judicial equitable division of assets; and (5)
the terms of the agreement are fair and reasonable both at the time of
execution and at the time of the divorce.103
The burden of proving these elements lies with the party seeking to enforce the
postnuptial agreement.104
1.

Fraud and Coercion

Postnuptial agreements are unenforceable if a spouse’s consent was obtained
through fraud or coercion.105 Enforceability of a postnuptial agreement relies on the
informed and voluntary consent of each spouse.106 In Craven-Ansin, the value of the
combined marital assets was approximately $19 million at the time of execution of the
agreement.107 The couple utilized a professional financial planner for financial advice
and preparation of joint tax returns, with whom they met with on a quarterly basis.108
The husband and wife each retained independent counsel to negotiate the postnuptial
agreement, which went through several drafts over the course of four months before
it was finalized and signed.109 In upholding the enforcement of the postnuptial
agreement, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determined that the agreement
was not a product of fraud or coercion, as each spouse had separate counsel who
vigorously negotiated on their behalf, and each were well-informed of the marital
assets at the time of execution.110 Thus, the evidence supported the conclusion that the
wife, the non-movant, made a voluntary choice to sign the postnuptial agreement.111
The wife’s consent was not obtained through fraud or coercion.
2.

Disclosure of Assets

Similar to Bedrick, Massachusetts adopts a standard of greater scrutiny with
respect to the asset disclosure required by postnuptial agreements.112 Spouses, as
fiduciaries to each other, are held to the “highest standards of good faith and fair

103 Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 963–64 (Mass. 2010).
104 Id. at 964.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 964–65.
107 Id. at 959.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 960.
110 Id. at 964.
111 Id. at 964–65.
112 Id. at 965.
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dealing in the performance of their contractual obligations.”113 Full and fair disclosure
of financial circumstances and assets, whether jointly or separately held, is required
for each individual spouse to make an informed decision regarding the terms of the
agreement.114 This requirement is satisfied if the party seeking to enforce the
agreement provided his or her spouse with a written statement containing an
approximation of the spouse’s significant assets, annual income, and any significant
future acquisitions or changes in income to which the party is legally entitled or
expects to realize in the near future.115 The disclosure does not need to be exact to be
considered “full” disclosure – the most approximate value of the assets will suffice.116
The full disclosure requirement guards against fraud and coercion in the negotiation
of the agreement as the parties have a clear understanding of the extent of the assets
and obligations to be divided.117
3.

Waiver

Massachusetts views the waiver requirement as being central to a contractualbased approach because it ensures that “each party is exercising a meaningful choice
when he or she agrees to give up certain rights.”118 Considerations include “the
adequacy of the time to review the agreement, the parties’ understanding of the terms
of the agreement and their effect, and a party’s understanding of his or her rights in
the absence of an agreement.”119 In Craven-Ansin, the postnuptial agreement at issue
included express language that satisfied the waiver requirement.120 Other evidence
taken into account by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in upholding the
parties’ postnuptial agreement included that the wife was represented by independent
counsel, affirmed in writing that she understood the rights she was waiving, and did
not claim that she did not understand any terms of the agreement.121

113 Id. (“The obligation is greater with respect to marital agreements because each spouse
owes a duty of absolute fidelity to the other.”).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 966.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 965; see also Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 2003) (noting that the full
disclosure requirement satisfies the higher burden of fiduciary relationships).
118 Ansin, 929 N.E.2d at 967. But cf. Stoner, 819 A.2d at 533 (refusing to incorporate waiver
requirement as additional safeguard for postnuptial agreements).
119 Ansin, 929 N.E.2d at 967.
120 The postnuptial agreement provided that it should govern “in lieu of and in full discharge
and satisfaction of the rights which otherwise arise by reason of their marriage.” Id.
121 Id.
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Fair and Reasonable Terms

The heightened scrutiny standard reappears in the fair and reasonable terms
condition of Craven-Ansin.122 The test set forth in Craven-Ansin focuses on the totality
of the circumstances in which the agreement was reached.123 However, Craven-Ansin
affords far greater discretion to the judge than the Bedrick approach. In determining
whether terms are fair and reasonable, a judge utilizes factors typically employed in
the evaluation of a separation agreement, including:
(1) the nature and substance of the objecting party’s complaint; (2) the
financial and property division provisions of the agreement as a whole; (3)
the context in which the negotiations took place; (4) the complexity of the
issues involved; (5) the background and knowledge of the parties; (6) the
experience and ability of counsel; (7) the need for and availability of experts
to assist the parties and counsel; and (8) the mandatory, and if the judge
deems is appropriate, the discretionary factors set forth in G.L.c. 208 § 34.124
The totality of the circumstances test is further broadened from the approach in
Bedrick in that the judge may allow “greater latitude for agreements reached where
each party is represented by separate counsel of their own choosing.”125 Indeed, the
wide discretion delegated to the judge is corroborated by the extensive list of
considerations that may be relevant in a judge’s determination of fair and reasonable
terms, including: the magnitude of disparity resulting from the terms of the postnuptial
agreement versus applicable legal principles; whether the purpose of the agreement
was to benefit or protect the interests of third parties; and the impact of enforcement
upon the parties’ children.126 Other factors evaluated by the court may include the
“length of the marriage, the motives of the contracting spouses, their respective
bargaining positions, the circumstances giving rise to the marital agreement, the

122 “Because a marital agreement is executed when the parties do not contemplate divorce
and when they owe absolute fidelity to each other, the heightened scrutiny . . . applies in this
context as well.” Id. at 968.
123 Id.
124 The court continued:
In relevant part, HN33 G. L. c. 208, § 34, provides that a judge “shall
consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the
marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each
of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital
assets and income. . . . [T]he court shall also consider the present and future
needs of the dependent children of the marriage. The court may also
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates and the
contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family unit.”
Id. at 969 n.20 (alteration in original).
125 Id. at 968.
126 Id.
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degree of the pressure, if any, experienced by the contesting spouse, and other
circumstances the judge finds relevant.”127 Most significantly, the court may uphold a
postnuptial agreement with an unfair distribution of assets, “as long as a judge has
concluded that the agreement is fair and reasonable.”128
C. Legislative Approaches
Several jurisdictions confront the validity of postnuptial agreements by statute,
with varying approaches. Colorado and North Dakota have adopted the Uniform
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (“UPMAA”).129 The UPMAA treats
prenuptial agreements and postnuptial agreements under the same set of principles and
requirements.130 The UPMAA seeks to achieve clarity and consistency in the
enforceability of marital agreements across the United States.131 While it recognizes
risks such as fairness, duress, and undue influence that may predominate in postnuptial
agreements, the UPMAA indicates the traditional principles of contract law are
sufficient to deal with such issues.132
The UPMAA requires postnuptial agreements to be in writing and signed by both
parties to be valid.133 The agreement will be immediately effective upon signing.134 A
postnuptial agreement will be unenforceable under the UPMAA if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves that consent to the agreement was involuntary or
obtained through duress.135 Furthermore, if a party did not have access to independent
legal representation, the agreement must include a notice of waiver of rights.136 The
UPMAA also requires full disclosure of assets prior to signing.137
Illinois expressly encourages the use of postnuptial agreements to “promote
amicable settlement of disputes,” subject only to a court’s determination of
unconscionability.138 Alabama defers to traditional contract principles and expressly

127 Id.
128 Id. at 969.
129 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-301 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.2-02 (2013).
130 Linda J. Ravdin, Premarital Agreements and the Uniform Acts, 39 FAM. ADVOC. 34, 35
(2017).
131 UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, prefatory note at 1 (UNIF. L. COMM’N
2012).
132 Id. at 2.
133 Id. § 6.
134 Id. § 7.
135 Id. § 9(a).
136 Id. For an example of what constitutes an adequate waiver of rights, see, e.g., infra note
141.
137 UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(a), (d).
138 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(b) (2018). The statute provides:

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/10

18

2021]

OHIO’S LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH MARITAL AGREEMENTS

529

recognizes the obligation of spousal fiduciary duty.139 Colorado imposes a waiver
requirement if a party is not represented by independent counsel.140 In such cases,
postnuptial agreements require a conspicuous notice of waiver of rights.141
Minnesota similarly provides that postnuptial agreements are valid and
enforceable if: “(a) there is a full and fair disclosure of the earnings and property of
each party, and (b) the parties have had an opportunity to consult with legal counsel
of their own choice.”142 Minnesota is one of several jurisdictions that utilize a
rebuttable presumption for determining validity. A postnuptial agreement is presumed
to be unenforceable if either spouse files for legal separation or dissolution within two
years of the date of execution.143 In California, a rebuttable presumption of undue
influence exists, arising from the requirement that spouses have a fiduciary duty to
one another.144 Louisiana uniquely requires spouses to obtain court approval prior to
entering into a postnuptial agreement.145

The terms of the agreement, except those providing for the support and
parental responsibility allocation of children, are binding upon the court
unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties
and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their own
motion or on request of the court, that the agreement is unconscionable.
Id.
139 “The husband and wife may contract with each other, but all contracts into which they
enter are subject to the rules of law as to contracts by and between persons standing in
confidential relations.” ALA. CODE. § 30-4-9 (2020).
140 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-309 (2014).
141 Colorado waiver language must be substantially similar to the following:
If you sign this agreement, you may be: [g]iving up your right to be
supported by the person you are marrying or to whom you are married;
[g]iving up your right to ownership or control of money and property;
[a]greeing to pay bills and debts of the person you are marrying or to whom
you are married; [g]iving up your right to money and property if your
marriage ends or the person to whom you are married dies; [and] [g]iving
up your right to have your legal fees paid.
Id. § 14-2-309(3).
142 MINN. STAT. § 519.11(1) (2005).
143 Id. § 519.11(1a)(d).
144 “This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing
on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential
relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital
business partners.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West 2020).
145 Spouses may enter into postnuptial agreements “only upon joint petition and a finding by
the court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing principles
and rules.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (1980).
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IV. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR OHIO POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
It is time for Ohio to join the majority of states that allow marital couples to have
control over their own marriages, rather than legislatively restrict agreements that
married couples may make. In order to accomplish this, the legislature should amend
Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06 to permit spouses to enter into contracts that alter
their legal relations. Absent any public or legislative discourse on the topic, Ohio will
remain in the minority by prohibiting postnuptial agreements on the notion that
postnuptial agreements are against public policy because they promote divorce.
If Ohio were to amend its statute to lift its prohibition on postnuptial agreements,
the legislature would likely impose certain conditions to address concerns of
unfairness, undue influence, and coercion. The Bedrick standard comports most with
Ohio’s stringent public policy requirements that strive to ensure that one party to the
marriage is not exploiting the other or using unfair pressure to force an agreement that
is not equitable. Bedrick’s standard for postnuptial agreements is stricter than the
standard laid down by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Gross for prenuptial agreements.
Gross fails to adequately address the concern for unconscionability, listing only three
basic requirements for prenuptial agreements – freely entering into the agreement; full
disclosure and understanding of assets; and terms that do not encourage divorce.146
Bedrick adequately focuses on protecting the fiduciary relationship – a principle
that comports with Ohio’s public policy rationale.147 Ohio should shift the focus from
its antiquated public policy perspective for postnuptial agreements to a modern
contractual perspective that protects spouses while preserving parties’ freedom to
contract. The Bedrick standard best exemplifies the standard Ohio should adopt for
the enforcement of postnuptial agreements. The standard set forth in Ansin-Craven is
unwieldy and grants excessive discretion to the judge in determining validity and thus
diminishes spouses’ contractual freedom. Moreover, traditional contractual remedies
will suffice to protect spouses in postnuptial agreements. Courts should be limited in
their inquiry into the reasonableness of the bargain, absent a finding of
unconscionability or other contractual principle that may invalidate the agreement.
Ohio unfairly denies spouses the freedom to contract with one another that they,
together, decide is in the best interest of their marriage. By prohibiting postnuptial
agreements, Ohio denies spouses the opportunity to enter into new agreements or
revise outdated prenuptial agreements that may not accurately reflect the current
conditions of the marriage. Current Ohio law does not permit spouses to amend
prenuptial agreements even to correct errors or ambiguities in the existing
agreement.148 Postnuptial agreements provide spouses with greater accuracy in
determining their rights and obligations than prenuptial agreements. At the onset of
the marriage, parties may only make assumptions regarding future conditions.149
Changed or unforeseen circumstances often arise in the marriage that warrant spouses’
alteration of their legal relations in the form of a postnuptial agreement.

146 Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio 1984).
147 See infra Part V.
148 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.06 (LexisNexis 1953).
149 Williams, supra note 8, at 828.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss2/10

20

2021]

OHIO’S LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH MARITAL AGREEMENTS

531

Following Bedrick and the majority of jurisdictions, Ohio should adopt express
conditions for the validity and enforcement of postnuptial agreements to protect the
fiduciary relationship between spouses. As a preliminary matter, postnuptial
agreements must be in writing to comply with the statute of frauds.150 The legislature
may opt to require notarization of the agreement as an added safeguard against fraud,
duress, undue influence, and other doctrines that may potentially invalidate
postnuptial agreements. Express conditions should be implemented to further reduce
this risk, such as fair and equitable terms at the time of execution and full disclosure
of each spouse’s assets and financial obligations. In harmony with other states, Ohio
postnuptial agreements must not be unconscionable at the time of enforcement.
Following Bedrick’s strict scrutiny approach ensures that the fiduciary relationship of
the spouses is protected, and reduces the risk of a finding of unenforceability. Such
express conditions also preserve the party’s freedom to contract, as the court will be
less likely to inquire as to the reasonableness of the bargain if the conditions are met.
If Ohio is concerned about the possibility of “profiteering by divorce,”151 the
legislature should follow Minnesota’s lead and further tighten requirements by
adopting a rebuttable presumption of unenforceability if either spouse files for divorce
within a certain number of years of the execution date. As an additional safeguard,
Ohio should require representation of each spouse by independent counsel, consistent
with common practice in marital agreements to protect the fiduciary relationship.
V. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS THE ENFORCEMENT OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
IN OHIO
Ohio currently resides with a minority of jurisdictions that claim postnuptial
agreements are invalid and unenforceable as a matter of public policy.152 Ohio’s public
policy rationale is inconsistent with the majority of states that hold postnuptial
agreements are consistent with public policy, and may even further the marital
relationship.153 Furthermore, Ohio’s view on postnuptial agreements contradicts its
own standard for prenuptial agreements, which are not contrary to public policy as
long as the “terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.”154

150 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05.
151 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.
152 The majority of jurisdictions across the United States acknowledge that postnuptial
agreements do not violate public policy. See, e.g., Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 24 (Conn.
2011) (“Postnuptial agreements are consistent with public policy; they realistically
acknowledge the high incidence of divorce and its effect upon our population.”); Lipic v. Lipic,
103 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (noting an absence of any public policy reasons why
postnuptial agreements should not be enforced).
153 “By alleviating anxiety over uncertainty in the determination of legal rights and
obligations upon dissolution, postnuptial agreements do not encourage or facilitate dissolution;
in fact, they harmonize with our public policy favoring enduring marriages.” In re Marriage of
Traster, 291 P.3d 494, 501 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); see also Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d
955, 969 (Mass. 2010) (rejecting the theory that postnuptial agreements are against public
policy).
154 Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 504.
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Ohio’s prohibition on postnuptial agreements dates back to principles of early
common law holding that a wife had no independent legal identity from her
husband.155 This patriarchal view of the law has no place in modern society.156 A wife
has a separate legal existence from her husband, evidenced by the basic principle that
any competent individual is free to enter into a contract on his or her own terms, as
long as the contract is not contrary to public policy.157 Ohio specifically espouses this
principle through Ohio Revised Code section 3103.05, which provides that a “husband
or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other
person.”158 However, Ohio arbitrarily draws the line at contracts between a husband
and wife that alter the legal relationship between the spouses. Indeed, Ohio permits
spouses to enter into prenuptial agreements, claiming such agreements are not contrary
to public policy, while treating postnuptial agreements as being void per se as being
against public policy.159
A contract is against public policy if it is injurious to the interest of the public,
contravenes an established societal interest, violates public statute, or interferes with
public welfare and safety.160 “Public policy relating to marriage is to foster and protect
it, to make it a permanent and public institution, to encourage the parties to live
together and to prevent separation.”161 Marital contracts are generally not contrary to
public policy unless they encourage divorce or separation.162 “An agreement will be
found to promote or encourage divorce if it obligates a spouse to procure a divorce, or
obligates a spouse not to defend or contest a divorce.”163 However, in the absence of

155 Nolin v. Pearson, 77 N.E. 890, 890 (Mass. 1906).
156 See Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 532 (Pa. 2003) (declining to adopt a paternalistic
approach to postnuptial agreements by refusing to implement a waiver requirement, noting such
an approach assumes the wife lacks the intelligence or ability to protect her own rights); see
also In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 15 (Ariz. 1969) (“In view of the relatively equal status
of women to men under the law, that married couples should not be deprived of the right by
contract to divide their property as they please, both presently and prospectively, assuming the
contract is voluntary, free from fraud, and is fair and equitable.”).
157 In re Marriage of Traster, 291 P.3d at 500.
158 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.05 (LexisNexis 1953).
159 Compare Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506 (noting that prenuptial agreements tend to promote
or facilitate marriage, rather than encourage divorce), with Brewsaugh v. Brewsaugh, 491
N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1985) (holding out-of-state postnuptial agreement unenforceable in Ohio in
violation of Section 3103.06 of the Ohio Revised Code). See also Hoffman v. Dobbins, No.
24633, 2009 WL 3119635, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2009) (rejecting wife’s public policy
argument that prohibiting postnuptial agreements would require “parties wishing to modify
certain provisions of an antenuptial agreement . . . to divorce, execute a new antenuptial
agreement, and remarry”).
160 In re Marriage of Traster, 291 P.3d at 500.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 501.
163 Id.
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terms or conditions that encourage divorce or separation, postnuptial agreements are
considered to be consistent with public policy in that they encourage the private
resolution of domestic disputes without resort to separation or divorce.164
Postnuptial agreements do not encourage divorce or separation, but rather they
allow spouses to voluntarily contract to determine their rights and obligations in the
event of dissolution. Postnuptial agreements are consistent with public policy as
spouses who enter into such agreements intend to preserve the marriage. Thus,
postnuptial agreements promote the unity of a married couple who intend to remain in
the marital relationship, rather than encouraging separation and divorce. Ohio’s
current prohibition on postnuptial agreements is likely to have the opposite of its
intended effect. While spouses may not enter into contracts after marriage to alter their
legal relations, Ohio expressly allows such an agreement if the parties agree to an
immediate separation.165
Indeed, Ohio’s statutory prohibition on postnuptial agreements precludes the
possibility that a married couple could strengthen their marriage, and better determine
and protect their rights with a consensual postnuptial agreement. Without the ability
to alter their rights in a changing marital landscape, Ohio’s prohibition is just as likely
to push a couple to separation as it is to prevent it.
Moreover, the language of Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06 is antiquated and
must be amended to reflect current public policy. The beginning of the statute provides
that “[a] husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter their legal
relations.”166 As a preliminary matter, the phrase “husband and wife” should be
amended to “spouses,” to reflect the legalization of same-sex marriage.167 Gender
equality necessitates the removal of gender-specific terms, such as “husband” and
“wife.” Contract law does not distinguish between men and women, and as simple
contracts, marital agreements are no different.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 3103.06
The Ohio State Bar Association’s Estate Planning, Trust, and Probate Law Section
Postnuptial Committee (the “Postnuptial Committee”) has recently proposed
legislation to amend Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06 to lift Ohio’s prohibition on
postnuptial agreements.168 The Postnuptial Committee’s proposed revisions to Ohio
Revised Code Sections 3103.05 and 3103.06 state as follows:
Proposed R.C. § 3103.05. Contracts. Spouses may enter into any agreement
or transaction with each other, or with any other person, which either might
if unmarried; subject, in agreements or transactions between spouses, to the
general rules which control the actions of persons occupying confidential
relations with each other; and to the extent an agreement alters the legal

164 Id.
165 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.05 (LexisNexis 1953).
166 Id. § 3103.06.
167 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680 (2015) (legalizing same-sex
marriage as a fundamental right in all States).
168 Racey & Ferraro, supra note 19, at 197–98.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021

23

534

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[69:511

relations between the spouses, such agreement shall comply with
requirements of Section 3103.06.169
Proposed R.C. § 3103.06. Contracts Affecting Marriage. Spouses may by
agreement do one or more of the following:
(A) Alter their legal relations with each other;
(B) Modify or terminate any written agreement affecting their legal
relations with each other, whether such agreement was entered into by the
parties prior to or during the marriage; and
(C) Agree to an immediate separation and make provisions for the support
of either of them and their children during the separation.
An agreement entered into pursuant to this section shall be in writing.170
Ohio should also adopt express conditions in Section 3103.06 that would further
protect the fiduciary relationship between spouses. Incorporating requirements such
as fair and equitable terms at the time of execution and full disclosure of assets would
subject parties to a high degree of good faith and fair dealing. Such conditions lower
the probability that a court will find the agreement to be unenforceable, thus preserving
the parties’ freedom to contract.
The following is an alternative proposal by this author to the Postnuptial
Committee’s proposed legislation,171 incorporating the express conditions discussed
supra:
Proposed R.C. § 3103.06. Contracts Affecting Marriage. Spouses may by
agreement do one or more of the following:
(A) Alter their legal relations with each other, subject to the rules of law
as to contracts by and between persons standing in confidential relations;
(B) Modify or terminate any written agreement affecting their legal
relations with each other, whether such agreement was entered into by the
parties prior to or during the marriage; and
(C) Agree to an immediate separation and make provisions for the support
of either of them and their children during the separation.
A postnuptial contract is valid and enforceable only if each spouse provides
full disclosure of the extent of their respective assets and obligations, and the
terms are procedurally and substantively fair and equitable both at the time
of its execution and at the time of its enforcement.
An agreement entered into pursuant to this section shall be in writing.

169 Id. at 198.
170 Id.
171 Changes from the Postnuptial Committee’s proposed legislation are emphasized in italics.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Since Gross v. Gross, Ohio has stalled in its evolution of marital law. Ohio can no
longer be considered an innovator in family law so long as it remains in the minority
of jurisdictions that prohibit postnuptial agreements. The high rate of divorce and
movement towards gender equality demands that Ohio Revised Code Section 3103.06
be revised to allow spouses to freely contract with one another regarding their legal
rights and obligations in the event of dissolution. Allowing two consensual spouses to
contract with one another is consistent with the basic notions of contract law.
Removing such prohibition will allow married couples to protect themselves after
marriage in cases of unforeseen circumstances, or to update an existing prenuptial
agreement that has become outdated. Postnuptial agreements provide spouses with the
opportunity to contract more precisely to reflect the current financial state of the
marriage, rather than remain bound by their assumptions at the onset of the marriage.
Strict scrutiny in determining the enforceability of postnuptial agreements adequately
protects the fiduciary relationship of spouses from fraud, duress, and undue influence.
The legislative approach is most attractive as it removes the uncertainty over whether
a court will uphold a postnuptial agreement for reasons of fairness or
unconscionability.
Postnuptial agreements are not contrary to public policy as they do not encourage
separation or divorce. Postnuptial agreements are distinguishable from separation
agreements in that postnuptial agreements are entered into to preserve the marital
relationship. Postnuptial agreements are most similar to prenuptial agreements in this
respect – the validity of which is uniformly recognized across the United States. Ohio
has recognized the validity of prenuptial agreements since 1984, holding that they
comport with the public policy of family unity. The same rationale applies to
postnuptial agreements, which differ only in the timing of when the contract is
executed. Time is of the essence for Ohio to amend Ohio Revised Code Section
3103.06 to lift Ohio’s prohibition on postnuptial agreements, and instead provide that
such agreements are valid and enforceable contracts between spouses.
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